
L1 - PS - what is risk Avignon |
1 |
What is risk and what is making mistakes. |
1 |
What is risk and what is making mistakes. |
2 |
Delft, October 12th, 1654 |
3 |
Danger |
4 |
Slide Number 5 |
5 |
Slide Number 6 |
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Slide Number 7 |
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Slide Number 8 |
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Slide Number 9 |
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Slide Number 10 |
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Slide Number 11 |
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Slide Number 12 |
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Risk or danger? |
13 |
What are statistics? |
14 |
What are statistics? |
15 |
First application |
16 |
What is risk? |
17 |
Slide Number 18 |
18 |
Slide Number 19 |
19 |
Top 10 health technology hazards for 2013 |
20 |
Slide Number 21 |
21 |
Slide Number 22 |
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Slide Number 23 |
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Quizz… |
24 |
Slide Number 25 |
25 |
Toulouse, Sept 21, 2001 |
26 |
Complex systems ? |
27 |
Complex systems ? |
28 |
Complex systems need elaborate monitoring and safety |
29 |
Slide Number 30 |
30 |
Paradox of automation |
31 |
MAINTENANCE CAN SERIOUSLY DAMAGE YOUR SYSTEM… |
32 |
Which aspect of maintenance is the most error prone? |
33 |
The Heinrich triangle |
34 |
Slide Number 35 |
35 |
The lifespan of a hypothetical organisation through the production-protection space |
36 |
L2 - TK - Setting the scene 2016 |
37 |
Setting the Scene |
37 |
Learning objectives |
38 |
Six major accidents will be reviewed |
39 |
1 – Erroneous commissioning of a linear accelerator for stereotactic treatments |
40 |
Inappropriate calibration |
41 |
Background |
42 |
Discovery and impact of the accident |
43 |
Lessons to learn |
44 |
References |
45 |
2 – Incorrect repair ofaccelerator |
46 |
Events: an overview |
47 |
A “faulty display” |
48 |
Events: an overview |
49 |
Consequences: an overview |
50 |
Slide Number 15 |
51 |
The Sagittaire accelerator |
52 |
The electron path |
53 |
During the repair |
54 |
Lessons to learn: Radiotherapy Department |
55 |
Aftermath |
56 |
3 – Accelerator interlock failure |
57 |
February 27, 2001 |
58 |
Continue… |
59 |
Action of the physicist |
60 |
Action of the physicist |
61 |
Vendor came in the next day |
62 |
Steps to initiate radiation |
63 |
Dose rate vs gun current |
64 |
Lessons in short |
65 |
4 – Mis-calibration of beam |
66 |
Erroneous calibration, Exeter, UK, 1988 |
67 |
Slide Number 33 |
68 |
What went wrong and how it was detected? |
69 |
Lessons |
70 |
Lessons to learn |
71 |
Looking around |
72 |
5 – In-correct use of treatment planning system |
73 |
North Staffordshire Royal Infirmary, 1982-1991 |
74 |
News when detected |
75 |
Lessons |
76 |
Looker further – Calibration of TPS – Australia |
77 |
6 – Non-updated data route or Erroneous use of treatment planning system and oncology information system |
78 |
Incorrect manual parameter transfer |
79 |
What happened? |
80 |
What happened? |
81 |
How did it hit the patient |
82 |
Discovery of accident |
83 |
Latent threat |
84 |
Lessons to learn |
85 |
Lessons to learn |
86 |
Looking around |
87 |
“Causes” of the accidents in this lecture |
88 |
Slide Number 54 |
89 |
L3 - EL - AUTOPSY OF EPINAL |
90 |
Autopsy of the Epinal accident |
90 |
Slide Number 2 |
91 |
The RT department of Epinal |
92 |
EPINAL |
93 |
19 months ? |
94 |
Why ? |
95 |
The initial report IGAS/ASN feb 2007 |
96 |
Interruption of the treatments |
97 |
Group I : the 24 victims |
98 |
Groupe II: the « 400» with excess of dose |
99 |
Group III: the « 5000 » with error of calculation |
100 |
Summary |
101 |
Follow up of the patients |
102 |
Fees |
103 |
Insurance fees Sham |
104 |
Starting the new treatments |
105 |
The Trial |
106 |
Accident in ToulouseApril 2006- April 2007 |
107 |
Main differences |
108 |
Conclusion |
109 |
L4 - AV - Lessons learned from radiotherapy accidentsdis |
110 |
Lessons learned from radiotherapy accidents |
110 |
Learning objectives |
111 |
Accidents in a healthcare |
112 |
Accidents in radiotherapy |
113 |
Potentiel for accidents in radiotherapy |
114 |
Why this complexity? |
115 |
Why this complexity? |
116 |
Why this complexity? |
117 |
Impact of complexity on errors in radiotherapy |
118 |
Types of errors |
119 |
Complexity and Automation |
120 |
Human complexity |
121 |
Human complexity |
122 |
Barriers |
123 |
Patient safety |
124 |
Patient safety |
125 |
Safety culture |
126 |
Safety culture |
127 |
Important points to remember |
128 |
References |
129 |
References |
130 |
L5 - TK - The genesis of an accident - 2016 |
131 |
The Genesis of an Accident |
131 |
Slide Number 2 |
132 |
Slide Number 3 |
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Radiotherapy process starts |
134 |
Modified plan is created |
135 |
Just occasionally??? |
136 |
Next step |
137 |
Continue |
138 |
Slide Number 9 |
139 |
Slide Number 10 |
140 |
Slide Number 11 |
141 |
St. Vincent’s Hospital, U.S.A. (2005) |
142 |
Treatments continues with the altered/new plan |
143 |
Treatment performed with the new plan |
144 |
Discovery |
145 |
Explanation of the erroneous dose |
146 |
Slide Number 17 |
147 |
Slide Number 18 |
148 |
Slide Number 19 |
149 |
Slide Number 20 |
150 |
Slide Number 21 |
151 |
Slide Number 22 |
152 |
Patient informed |
153 |
From the files of DOH - NYC |
154 |
DOH files cont… 25 March 2005 |
155 |
DOH files cont .. 19 April 2005 |
156 |
Varian’s Response |
157 |
Excerpt from a Varian letter to all customers |
158 |
Lessons to learn |
159 |
Slide Number 30 |
160 |
Slide Number 31 |
161 |
Slide Number 32 |
162 |
Questions |
163 |
Jan 2010 |
164 |
Energy and Commerce - Subcommittee on Health held a hearing entitled "Medical Radiation: An Overview of the Issues" on Friday, February 26, 2010 |
165 |
Mr Park’s Testimony Pt 1 |
166 |
References |
167 |
Thanks for listening |
168 |
Slide Number 39 |
169 |
Next session |
170 |
Slide Number 41 |
171 |
Slide Number 42 |
172 |
Do Accidents Still Happens? |
173 |
Aftermath |
174 |
L7 - PS - Why reporting incidents |
175 |
Why reporting incidents ? |
175 |
Quality & safety management |
176 |
Heinrich Triangle |
177 |
Heinrich investigation |
178 |
Heinrich investigation |
179 |
Heinrich investigation |
180 |
violation |
181 |
Heinrich Triangle |
182 |
Causes ? |
183 |
One example (Brindisi) |
184 |
Slide Number 11 |
185 |
Slide Number 12 |
186 |
Slide Number 13 |
187 |
violations |
188 |
Education and training |
189 |
L8 - AV - Incident reportingdis |
190 |
Incident reporting |
190 |
Learning objectives |
191 |
Incident reporting systems |
192 |
Terms and definitions |
193 |
Incident reporting systems |
194 |
Incident reporting and LEARNING systems |
195 |
Incident reporting and learning systems (IRLS) |
196 |
1. Identifying the event |
197 |
2. Reporting the event |
198 |
3. Investigating the event |
199 |
3. Investigating the event |
200 |
4. Causal analysis |
201 |
4. Causal analysis |
202 |
5. Corrective actions |
203 |
6. Learning |
204 |
6. Learning |
205 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
206 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
207 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
208 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
209 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
210 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
211 |
Prerequisites of IRLS |
212 |
Types of IRLS |
213 |
Internal versus external systems |
214 |
Compulsory versus voluntary |
215 |
Specialized versus institutional |
216 |
Incident reporting and learning systems |
217 |
Slide Number 29 |
218 |
Safron |
219 |
Important points to remember |
220 |
REferences |
221 |
REferences |
222 |
L9 - EL - communication to the media |
223 |
Slide Number 1 |
223 |
Summary |
224 |
19 months ? |
225 |
Main differences |
226 |
Slide Number 5 |
227 |
4 families of risk factors |
228 |
Slide Number 7 |
229 |
Slide Number 8 |
230 |
Slide Number 9 |
231 |
Slide Number 10 |
232 |
Roles and responsibilities |
233 |
What’s a crisis ? An unexpected event that may damage your organization reputation (or more…) |
234 |
Before a crisis |
235 |
During: ACTION |
236 |
AFTER |
237 |
Which event to communicate on? |
238 |
Slide Number 17 |
239 |
Why getting the precursor events ? |
240 |
But consequences are very different !!!!!! |
241 |
Lille |
242 |
When accident is known: |
243 |
Slide Number 22 |
244 |
Not to get it again (the crisis): |
245 |
Conclusion |
246 |
L10 - PD - ESTRO-Taxonomy2016 |
247 |
Slide Number 1 |
247 |
Slide Number 2 |
248 |
Slide Number 3 |
249 |
Slide Number 4 |
250 |
Slide Number 5 |
251 |
Slide Number 6 |
252 |
Slide Number 7 |
253 |
Slide Number 8 |
254 |
Slide Number 9 |
255 |
Slide Number 10 |
256 |
Slide Number 11 |
257 |
Slide Number 12 |
258 |
Slide Number 13 |
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Slide Number 14 |
260 |
Slide Number 15 |
261 |
Slide Number 16 |
262 |
Slide Number 17 |
263 |
Slide Number 18 |
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Slide Number 19 |
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Slide Number 20 |
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Slide Number 21 |
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Slide Number 22 |
268 |
Slide Number 23 |
269 |
Slide Number 24 |
270 |
Slide Number 25 |
271 |
Slide Number 26 |
272 |
Slide Number 27 |
273 |
TG 100’s Process Tree |
274 |
Ford’s Process Map |
275 |
Slide Number 30 |
276 |
Slide Number 31 |
277 |
Slide Number 32 |
278 |
Slide Number 33 |
279 |
Slide Number 34 |
280 |
Slide Number 35 |
281 |
Slide Number 36 |
282 |
Slide Number 37 |
283 |
Slide Number 38 |
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Slide Number 39 |
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Slide Number 40 |
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Slide Number 41 |
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Slide Number 42 |
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Slide Number 43 |
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Slide Number 44 |
290 |
Slide Number 45 |
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Slide Number 46 |
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Slide Number 47 |
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Slide Number 48 |
294 |
Slide Number 49 |
295 |
Slide Number 50 |
296 |
Slide Number 51 |
297 |
Slide Number 52 |
298 |
Slide Number 53 |
299 |
Slide Number 54 |
300 |
Slide Number 55 |
301 |
Slide Number 56 |
302 |
Slide Number 57 |
303 |
Slide Number 58 |
304 |
L11 - PR - sundayPrisma and PRISMA-rt |
305 |
Prisma model & PRISMA-RT |
305 |
Slide Number 2 |
306 |
(part 1) PRISMA in MAASTRO |
307 |
What do we want from the reports? |
308 |
PRISMA - model |
309 |
PRISMA-model |
310 |
Advantages of the PRISMA-model |
311 |
Slide Number 8 |
312 |
patient data exchange |
313 |
classifications codes of rootcauses |
314 |
Slide Number 11 |
315 |
management actions |
316 |
Action / Classification Matrix |
317 |
example of data analyse |
318 |
Slide Number 15 |
319 |
Slide Number 16 |
320 |
deviation between location of treatment |
321 |
Slide Number 18 |
322 |
who report over who? |
323 |
trends in H/T/O |
324 |
Slide Number 21 |
325 |
reporting committee |
326 |
reporting committee |
327 |
Conclusions |
328 |
(part 2) PRISMA explanation |
329 |
Humans in complex situation |
330 |
Error is Inevitable Because of Human Limitations |
331 |
(part 3): PRISMA-explanation |
332 |
Slide Number 29 |
333 |
Slide Number 30 |
334 |
Slide Number 31 |
335 |
Slide Number 32 |
336 |
Contextvariable MAASTRO |
337 |
PRISMA manual |
338 |
(part 3) PRISMA –rt collaboration |
339 |
Advantages of a national system |
340 |
association between of 17 Dutch radiotherapy departments |
341 |
1. content of the local part of database |
342 |
Slide Number 39 |
343 |
Slide Number 40 |
344 |
Slide Number 41 |
345 |
2. content of the benchmark |
346 |
Slide Number 43 |
347 |
example: Benchmark information used in a department |
348 |
Slide Number 45 |
349 |
Method LIBB ( interobserver variability research) |
350 |
Results LIBB, |
351 |
Results PRISMA-RT NL |
352 |
Slide Number 49 |
353 |
Futur ? |
354 |
Questions ??????Petra.reijnders@maastro.nl |
355 |
L12 - PR - sunday workshop PRISMA |
356 |
PRISMA workshop guide Lines |
356 |
Learning objectives |
357 |
PRISMA-tree development |
358 |
Slide Number 4 |
359 |
Steps of a PRISMA analyse |
360 |
Stopping rules |
361 |
Slide Number 7 |
362 |
Group exercise (1 hour) |
363 |
questions!!!! |
364 |
L13 - EL - legal aspects final |
365 |
Slide Number 1 |
365 |
Radiotherapy Process |
366 |
Slide Number 3 |
367 |
|
368 |
Slide Number 5 |
369 |
Slide Number 6 |
370 |
Slide Number 7 |
371 |
Slide Number 8 |
372 |
Slide Number 9 |
373 |
Notification system |
374 |
Notification system |
375 |
Notification system |
376 |
Notification system |
377 |
Slide Number 14 |
378 |
Slide Number 15 |
379 |
Slide Number 16 |
380 |
Slide Number 17 |
381 |
|
382 |
Slide Number 19 |
383 |
Slide Number 20 |
384 |
Slide Number 21 |
385 |
Slide Number 22 |
386 |
|
387 |
|
388 |
|
389 |
Slide Number 26 |
390 |
Equipments/drugs AFSSAPS/ANSM |
391 |
Slide Number 28 |
392 |
Outside of France |
393 |
UK recommendations |
394 |
Slide Number 31 |
395 |
Conclusion n°4 |
396 |
Conclusion n°6 |
397 |
Slide Number 34 |
398 |
L14 - PD - ESTRO-Ethics2016 |
399 |
Slide Number 1 |
399 |
Slide Number 2 |
400 |
Ethics for Radiation Medicine Professionals |
401 |
Ethics for Radiation Medicine Professionals |
402 |
Slide Number 5 |
403 |
Slide Number 6 |
404 |
Slide Number 7 |
405 |
Slide Number 8 |
406 |
Slide Number 9 |
407 |
Slide Number 10 |
408 |
Slide Number 11 |
409 |
Slide Number 12 |
410 |
Slide Number 13 |
411 |
Slide Number 14 |
412 |
Slide Number 15 |
413 |
Slide Number 16 |
414 |
Slide Number 17 |
415 |
Slide Number 18 |
416 |
Slide Number 19 |
417 |
Slide Number 20 |
418 |
Slide Number 21 |
419 |
Slide Number 22 |
420 |
Slide Number 23 |
421 |
Slide Number 24 |
422 |
Slide Number 25 |
423 |
Slide Number 26 |
424 |
Slide Number 27 |
425 |
Slide Number 28 |
426 |
Slide Number 29 |
427 |
Slide Number 30 |
428 |
Slide Number 31 |
429 |
Slide Number 32 |
430 |
Slide Number 33 |
431 |
Slide Number 34 |
432 |
Slide Number 35 |
433 |
Slide Number 36 |
434 |
Slide Number 37 |
435 |
Slide Number 38 |
436 |
Slide Number 39 |
437 |
Slide Number 40 |
438 |
Slide Number 41 |
439 |
Slide Number 42 |
440 |
Slide Number 43 |
441 |
Slide Number 44 |
442 |
Slide Number 45 |
443 |
Slide Number 46 |
444 |
Slide Number 47 |
445 |
Slide Number 48 |
446 |
Slide Number 49 |
447 |
Slide Number 50 |
448 |
Slide Number 51 |
449 |
Slide Number 52 |
450 |
Slide Number 53 |
451 |
Slide Number 54 |
452 |
Slide Number 55 |
453 |
Slide Number 56 |
454 |
Slide Number 57 |
455 |
Slide Number 58 |
456 |
L15 - PS - Just culture Avignon |
457 |
A Just culture |
457 |
So, what are Human Factors? |
458 |
So, what are Human Factors? |
459 |
Blame Culture |
460 |
Blame Culture |
461 |
Problems with a blame culture |
462 |
Problems with a blame culture |
463 |
Problems with a blame culture |
464 |
tchernobyl |
465 |
Problems with a blame culture |
466 |
Problems with a blame culture |
467 |
Problems with a blame culture |
468 |
No-Blame Culture |
469 |
Safety rules on an air carrier |
470 |
Safety rules on an air carrier |
471 |
Problems with a No-blame culture |
472 |
A ‘Just’ Culture |
473 |
Just Culture |
474 |
Why we do need a “Just” Culture? |
475 |
Why we do need a “Just” Culture? |
476 |
A problem in 1996 |
477 |
A plane crash a day |
478 |
Problems with a Just Culture |
479 |
Just Culture Code of Practice (1) |
480 |
Just Culture Code of Practice (2) |
481 |
Just Culture Code of Practice (3) |
482 |
tchernobyl |
483 |
Two sides of a same coin |
484 |
Toulouse, Sept 21, 2001 |
485 |
Slide Number 30 |
486 |
Problem 1 |
487 |
Problem 2 |
488 |
Problem 3 |
489 |
Problem 4 |
490 |
Two key operational realities a just culture policy needs to accommodate |
491 |
The Operational Reality : Professional dilemmas |
492 |
Key professional dilemmas |
493 |
The Operational Reality : Routine Non-Compliance |
494 |
Organisational Learning |
495 |
Absence of Just Culture can cause |
496 |
Learning from Errors & Incidents |
497 |
L16 - PD - ESTRO-Near Miss2016 |
498 |
Slide Number 1 |
498 |
Slide Number 2 |
499 |
Slide Number 3 |
500 |
Slide Number 4 |
501 |
Slide Number 5 |
502 |
Slide Number 6 |
503 |
Slide Number 7 |
504 |
Slide Number 8 |
505 |
Slide Number 9 |
506 |
Slide Number 10 |
507 |
Slide Number 11 |
508 |
Slide Number 12 |
509 |
Slide Number 13 |
510 |
Slide Number 14 |
511 |
Slide Number 15 |
512 |
Slide Number 16 |
513 |
Slide Number 17 |
514 |
Slide Number 18 |
515 |
Slide Number 19 |
516 |
Slide Number 20 |
517 |
Slide Number 21 |
518 |
Slide Number 22 |
519 |
Slide Number 23 |
520 |
Slide Number 24 |
521 |
Slide Number 25 |
522 |
Slide Number 26 |
523 |
Slide Number 27 |
524 |
Slide Number 28 |
525 |
Slide Number 29 |
526 |
Slide Number 30 |
527 |
Slide Number 31 |
528 |
Slide Number 32 |
529 |
Slide Number 33 |
530 |
Slide Number 34 |
531 |
Slide Number 35 |
532 |
Slide Number 36 |
533 |
Slide Number 37 |
534 |
Slide Number 38 |
535 |
Slide Number 39 |
536 |
Slide Number 40 |
537 |
Slide Number 41 |
538 |
Slide Number 42 |
539 |
Slide Number 43 |
540 |
Slide Number 44 |
541 |
Slide Number 45 |
542 |
Slide Number 46 |
543 |
Slide Number 47 |
544 |
Slide Number 48 |
545 |
Slide Number 49 |
546 |
IAEA’s e-learning program |
547 |
Slide Number 51 |
548 |
L17 - AV - Safety in the RT departmentdis |
549 |
Safety in the RT department |
549 |
Learning objectives |
550 |
Human complexity |
551 |
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
552 |
Forcing functions |
553 |
Forcing functions |
554 |
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
555 |
Automation and computerization |
556 |
Automation and computerization |
557 |
Slide Number 10 |
558 |
Slide Number 11 |
559 |
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
560 |
Simplification and standardisation |
561 |
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
562 |
Checklist |
563 |
Slide Number 16 |
564 |
Workflow management systems |
565 |
Open source solution – iTP |
566 |
Double checks |
567 |
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
568 |
Slide Number 21 |
569 |
Effectiveness of different approaches in preventing errors |
570 |
Training |
571 |
Points to remember |
572 |
References |
573 |
L18 - PR - monday HFMEA |
574 |
Health care Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (HFMEA), a prospective method |
574 |
content of presentation |
575 |
Retrospective |
576 |
Proactive |
577 |
Slide Number 5 |
578 |
Learning Objectives |
579 |
prospective risk models |
580 |
overview proactive risk models |
581 |
Rough deviation of the models |
582 |
COSO/ERM |
583 |
Six Sigma/Lean |
584 |
Food and drink industry: HACCP |
585 |
HAZOP / HAZAN |
586 |
What is (H)FMEA? |
587 |
History of FMEA |
588 |
(H)FMEA |
589 |
HFMEA |
590 |
HFMEA-organization |
591 |
Process prescription as fundament for HFMEA |
592 |
Slide Number 20 |
593 |
Process prescription f.e. |
594 |
tips for process description |
595 |
What is a Failure Mode? |
596 |
6 M’s to define the failure modes |
597 |
HFMEA Procedure (1) |
598 |
HFMEA Procedure (2) |
599 |
Flow of the Analysis |
600 |
Risk Priority Number (RPN) |
601 |
Rating Scales |
602 |
Scaling severity and probability (for example) |
603 |
checklist |
604 |
HFMEA form |
605 |
After Calculation RPN |
606 |
conclusions |
607 |
Are there no incidents after doing a HFMEA? |
608 |
MAASTRO’s experience |
609 |
research within MAASTRO |
610 |
References |
611 |
Tips and tricks |
612 |
tip |
613 |
HFMEA and the RCA Process |
614 |
questions!!!! |
615 |
simple exercise |
616 |
sub processes |
617 |
2. taking breakfast |
618 |
2.3 break an egg |
619 |
Slide Number 47 |
620 |
HFMEA analyses MAASTRO |
621 |
Relationship between prospective and retrospective risk analyses |
622 |
questions!!!! |
623 |
L19 - PR - monday workshop HFMEA |
624 |
workshop HFMEA |
624 |
Learning Objectives |
625 |
(H)FMEA |
626 |
method |
627 |
HFMEA Organisation (1) |
628 |
(2) |
629 |
Division of roles between membres and Time involved |
630 |
Exercise |
631 |
examples of process |
632 |
define process/subprocesses and select a piece of a subprocess |
633 |
tips for process description |
634 |
Slide Number 12 |
635 |
questions!!!! |
636 |
L20 - PR - monday combining retrospective and prospective |
637 |
Pracitical example how to use Patient Safetytools during transitioncombining prospective and retrospective risk management |
637 |
MAASTRO |
638 |
Facts - Staff |
639 |
Facts- Treatments |
640 |
content of the presentation |
641 |
Risk Rt and transitions |
642 |
Impact transitions |
643 |
tools used |
644 |
1: PRISMA - model |
645 |
Varian equipment |
646 |
Bilocation Venlo |
647 |
Histogram of the classification code |
648 |
tools used |
649 |
Varian equipment |
650 |
Bilocation Venlo |
651 |
Slide Number 16 |
652 |
Improve bord |
653 |
tools used |
654 |
New items for selective treatment check |
655 |
Culture & communication |
656 |
tools used |
657 |
2013 visitation of our member of the board |
658 |
tools used |
659 |
RTT with area of interest Patient safety |
660 |
Slide Number 25 |
661 |
Publication national RTT journal |
662 |
ERM/enterprise risk management |
663 |
Risk area’s |
664 |
Slide Number 29 |
665 |
L21 - AV - Communication in safetydis |
666 |
Communication in safety |
666 |
Learning objectives |
667 |
Communication in safety |
668 |
Communication to prevent errors |
669 |
Slide Number 5 |
670 |
Slide Number 6 |
671 |
Checklist in surgery? |
672 |
Slide Number 8 |
673 |
Communication to prevent errors |
674 |
Communication within the organization/with the patients |
675 |
Post incident management |
676 |
Who are the victims of an error? |
677 |
What the patient/family wants… |
678 |
What the patient/family wants… |
679 |
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
680 |
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
681 |
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
682 |
Communication with victims – Who, when and what |
683 |
Communicating with the second victims |
684 |
Third victim… |
685 |
Important points to remember |
686 |
References |
687 |
L22 - PD - ESTRO-Human Factors 2016 |
688 |
Slide Number 1 |
688 |
Slide Number 2 |
689 |
Slide Number 3 |
690 |
Slide Number 4 |
691 |
Slide Number 5 |
692 |
Skill-based performance |
693 |
Rule-based performance |
694 |
Knowledge-based performance |
695 |
Performance categories |
696 |
Where does competency fit in? |
697 |
Slide Number 11 |
698 |
How might our performance be sub-optimal? |
699 |
Error – Expanded definition |
700 |
Skill – Based Errors |
701 |
Skill – Based Errors |
702 |
Skill – Based Errors |
703 |
Skill – Based Errors |
704 |
Rule – Based Issues |
705 |
Rule – Based Issues |
706 |
Knowledge – Based Mistakes |
707 |
Knowledge – Based Mistakes |
708 |
Violations |
709 |
Violations |
710 |
Violations |
711 |
Comparison of Error Types |
712 |
Slide Number 26 |
713 |
Mapping Performance Levels to Error Types |
714 |
Is There Another Way of Classifying Errors? |
715 |
Mapping Error Categories to Error Types |
716 |
Slide Number 30 |
717 |
Performance categories |
718 |
Violations – Preventive Measures |
719 |
Knowledge–Preventive Measures |
720 |
Rules – Preventive Measures |
721 |
Skills – Preventive Measures |
722 |
Time-outs |
723 |
Time-outs |
724 |
No Interruption Zone (NIZ) |
725 |
No Interruption Zone |
726 |
No Interruption Zone |
727 |
No Interruption Zone |
728 |
First Date Rule |
729 |
First Date Rule |
730 |
Intuition |
731 |
Power Distance Index |
732 |
Power Distance Index |
733 |
Power Distance Index |
734 |
Power Distance Index |
735 |
Power Distance Index |
736 |
Slide Number 50 |
737 |
Slide Number 51 |
738 |
Slide Number 52 |
739 |
Slide Number 53 |
740 |
Slide Number 54 |
741 |
Slide Number 55 |
742 |
Slide Number 56 |
743 |
Slide Number 57 |
744 |
Slide Number 58 |
745 |
L23 - Role play |
746 |
Role play |
746 |
A voluntary |
747 |
A voluntary |
748 |
A voluntary |
749 |
A voluntary |
750 |
A voluntary |
751 |
A voluntary |
752 |
A voluntary |
753 |
The scenario |
754 |